We model a typical Asian-crisis-economy using dynamic general equilibrium techniques. Meaningful exchange rates obtain from nontrivial demands for fiat currencies. Sudden stops/bank-panics are possible, and key for evaluating the relative merits of alternative exchange rate regimes in promoting stability. Strategic complementarities contribute to the severe indeterminacy of the continuum of equilibria; there is a strong association between the scope for existence and indeterminacy of equilibria, the properties along dynamic paths and the underlying policy regime. Binding multiple reserve requirements reduce the scope for financial fragility and panic equilibria; backing the money supply acts as a stabilizer only in fixed regimes.
Introduction
We study the interaction between monetary policies and alternative exchange rate regimes to ascertain the probability of a crisis, building from the characteristics of the Asian-crisis countries in 1997. Our broader goal is to reinforce and fill in the link between the overexpansion of the financial system, banking crises, and exchange rate regimes/monetary policy that we find lacking in the literature. With this in mind, we build a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model (DSGE) --from micro-foundations--replicating a small, open economy (SOE) with a nontrivial banking system, such as one of the 1997 East Asian countries. Two words of caution to the reader: First, this paper does not aim, from a historical point of view, to show the success of a particular monetary policy in place either in defending the national currency or in managing contagion at the time of the crisis. Our goal, instead, takes the form of a "what if:" what if a typical Asian-crisis-country were to implement a policy of multiple reserve requirements with backing of the domestic money supply, and how would it work under alternative exchange rate arrangements? Thus, we look forward and aim to suggest policy options that ♦ We owe special thanks to David Bessler, Li Gan and Dennis Jansen for helpful comments and suggestions to previous versions of this paper. We thank Teri Tenalio for her technical assistance. We would also like to thank the participants of the 2007 Midwest Macroeconomic Meetings, the 2007 Southwestern Association Meetings and the 2009 Midwest Economics Association Meetings for helpful suggestions. ♣ Corresponding author. E-mail: wenyaowang@tamu.edu ♣ Corresponding author. E-mail: phernandez@econmail.tamu.edu may help these countries maintain stability in case a similar crisis was to hit again. Second, at this time, we do not consider economic activity explicitly other than in the financial sector.
Our model captures all five stylized facts of the East Asian countries at the time of the crisis. It is general knowledge that Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand were the countries most affected by the East Asian 1997/98 crisis, followed by Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines. There are five stylized facts shared by these countries at the time of the crisis that we want to emphasize. 1) Increased risky-lending behavior by banks led to a boom in private borrowing financed by non-performing loans 1 .
2) The lack of sound financial structure worsened with the ill-oriented process of financial and capital liberalization 2 . 3) Banks' financial assets constituted the majority of their total assets -instead, for instance, of financing in capital markets. 4) Borrowing from foreign banks was a significant portion of domestic banks' loans. 5) The majority of these countries had intermediate pegs in place. According to the standard chronology of the crisis, the floating of the baht in July 1997 in Thailand triggered the crisis. A subsequent change in expectations led to the depreciation of most currencies in the region, bank runs, rapid withdrawals of foreign capital --a sudden stop-and a dramatic economic downturn followed. Unlike previous crises originated from fiscal imbalances and/or trade deficits, the Asian crises shed light on the increased risky behavior and the overexpansion of the banking system.
To build the framework that we just described, we used three building blocks that took us closer to our goal systematically. In the first block, we model explicitly the behavior of individuals and obtain the microfoundations for our general equilibrium model. In the second block, we introduce alternative exchange rate The third building block may allow one to infer behavior from a particular set of circumstances: we may be able to separate and identify causes and consequences by studying separately and jointly the main stylized facts of sudden stops and bank-runs in similar economies 3 .
We consider two potential causes of crises: a crisis comes to our model either in the form of a sudden stop of foreign credit (intrinsic uncertainty) or in the form of a panic among national depositors (extrinsic uncertainty.)
We put most of our effort on the distinguishing characteristic of the former but do not neglect the fact that a selffulfilling panic and run may implicitly aggravate a crisis.
We believe that we improve on C-V in at least three dimensions. First, C-V attached intrinsic value to currencies they intended to be fiat 4. We instead take multiple fiat currencies -domestic and foreign-a bit more seriously, and introduce non-trivial demands for them. In particular, banks must hold a fraction of their deposits as unremunerated currency reserves: a fraction to be held in the form of domestic currency and another fraction in the form of foreign currency. Then, fiat money instead enters our model by the regulation that governs the multiple reserve requirements in this economy 5 , the implications being that: 1) there is a meaningful nominal exchange rate in our model, and 2) this nominal exchange rate will be determined according to the exchange rate regime and the monetary policy in place. In second place, we use a DSGE model in an economy with an infinite horizon, as is the OG. Thus, we are able to discuss the interesting equilibrium dynamics defining each exchange rate arrangement, as opposed to both D-D and C-V. In third place, we improve the way in which we introduce and treat potential crises, The potential for strategic complementarities and the realization of self-fulfilling
prophesies is ever present in alternative versions of the OG model with outside assets in general, and models with one or more fiat currencies in particular 6 , and, of course, in our model. In such contexts, the presence of informational and institutional frictions can exacerbate situations that are already problematic, such as credit rationing, financial repression and endogenously arising volatility, thus complicating the standard analysis of separating and pooling equilibria. Thus, the appropriate utilization of the information and action sets available to agents at all points in time is critical. In this respect, we reformulate the sequential checking constraint by depositors and devise a re-optimization problem by banks after a sudden stop 7. Our results show the existence of a continuum of equilibria that are indeterminate in two ways: 1) an allocation may be consistent with a continuum of relative price vectors, and 2) a vector of relative prices may be consistent with several different allocations. There is a strong association between the scope for existence and indeterminacy of equilibria, the properties along dynamic paths and the underlying policy regime. Binding multiple reserve requirements may help in reducing the scope for financial fragility and panic equilibria, but backing of the domestic money supply has stabilizing effects only under fixed exchange rates.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we analyze the properties of stationary and dynamic equilibria under the alternative exchange rate regimes where no crises are possible in equilibrium. In Section 4, we allow for the possibility of crises by introducing extrinsic and intrinsic uncertainties. Section 5 concludes.
Floating Exchange Rates: the Case of Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand
In this section, we build the model of a SOE that captures the main stylized characteristics shared by the Indonesian, Korean, Filipino and Thai economies at the time of the crisis. Here, we focus on the construction of the general equilibrium and, thus, we do not allow for any event that could lead to a crisis of any type. The reader interested can find the analysis of crises in Section 4.
The (private) banking sector is a net debtor with respect to the rest of the world, and there is an exogenous and binding upper limit to foreign credit faced by domestic banks at each point in time, so that credit is always rationed. We will observe ex-ante identical domestic agents who face uncertainty as to their preferences types. The distribution of this shock is public information, but its realization is known only by the private agents. Our model has the potential for strategic complementarities, taking the form of a standard problem in coordination that may lead to crises of a self-fulfilling type 8 . We will see that two fiat national currencies can potentially circulate simultaneously: a domestic fiat currency and a foreign fiat currency. The legal regulations in financial intermediation and foreign exchange establish the following: 1) All intermediated domestic investment is subject to multiple, unremunerated and binding reserve requirements. 2) A flexible exchange rate regime is in place, and thus the nominal exchange rate will be market-determined; and 3) There are no legal domestic restrictions on either using foreign currency or on obtaining foreign credit.
The Environment
Consider a pure exchange, SOE consisting of an infinite sequence of two-date-lived, overlapping generations.
Time is discrete, and indexed by 1, 2,3,... t = . Standard analysis of an overlapping-generations economy typically groups households into two categories: all the future generations versus the generation of initial old.
Moreover, we will observe four groups of players in this model economy: households, domestic banks, foreign banks and the domestic monetary authority. Foreign banks will lend to domestic banks inelastically at the world interest rates and up to the exogenous binding limit. The monetary authority in this model economy is in charge of choosing the combination of monetary policies consistent with floating exchange rates.
Each of the future generations, on the one hand, consists of a continuum of households with unit mass.
A household born at date t is young at date t and old at date 1 t + . Households within a generation are ex ante identical, but they can become of one of the following types before the end of their youth: impatient, with probability (0, 1) λ ∈ , and patient, with probability (1 ) λ − . As we will see later on, impatient households will 8 The decisions made by individual agents will be intertwined with the choices of other agents, giving rise to strategic interdependence between an agent's actions and the actions of others.
derive utility from consuming before the end of their youth ( 1,t c ,) while patient households will derive utility only from consuming in their old age ( 2, 1 t c + .) On the other hand, at 0 t = , there is a generation of initial old.
The initial old consist of a continuum of old households with unit mass. The fraction ( ) 1 λ − of these initial old are of the patient type.
Each date has two parts that we will call morning and afternoon, since different types of interaction will take place in each of them 9 . Domestic banks will turn out to be coalitions of individual households, they will be competitive, and we can assume then that they are identical. The latter facilitates the analysis by allowing the examination of only a representative bank. 
Households and domestic banks have access to the following storage/investment technology: for one unit of good invested -not consumed--at the beginning of date t , the household receives the return 1 R > goods at the end of date 1 t + . However, she would receive only a return of 1 r < if she were to liquidate the investment early, by the end of date t 10 . Then, the condition to promote truth-telling can be written as
The inequality above must hold as the incentive-compatibility or self-selection condition that allows no motivation for patient agents to misrepresent their types. In the remainder of this section and in Section 3, we assume that the inequality (2) holds while we build the general equilibrium.
Multiple Fiat Currencies. Two fiat and outside national currencies may circulate in the small, open economy at any point in time. The first one is the domestic fiat national currency, while the second is a foreign currency that serves also the purpose of international currency. To fix ideas, we will call the domestic currency the won and the foreign/international currency the US dollar.
On the first hand, it is apparent that the monetary authority in the domestic country has the monopoly in issuing wons, where t M is the outstanding nominal stock of wons at the end of date t . The domestic price level t p represents the number of wons to be exchanged for one unit of the single good at date t , and ( )
is the real return on wons. As is standard in economies with floating exchange rates, the monetary authority has 9 This separation is indispensable to our setup, because the sequence in which events take place and information becomes available are essential in determining the coordination between agents (or the lack of) and the nature of the information problem in place. 10 The only available technology for the short-term investment is this same storage technology. For instance, if an agent liquidates early, she would get the return 1 r < per good at the end of date t, and if she stores the proceeds again between the end of date t and the end of date 1 t + , then she will get the return 2 1 r r r R ⋅ = < < per good at the end of date We also assume that there is free international capital mobility, free international trade with homogeneous goods and no legal restrictions to the use of foreign currency in the domestic country. As a result, the Law of One Price will hold in equilibrium, so that
e p p ⋅ = is always satisfied.
With respect to the general guidelines for monetary policy, the monetary authority in the domestic economy accomplishes all injections and/or withdrawals of wons through lump-sum transfers. In particular, each young household will receive the equivalent in wons of t τ goods ex ante, at the beginning of date t, regardless of type. We have two reasons behind our choice of this particular scheme of monetary transfers: first, it enters the self-selection constraint neutrally without adding to the information problem, and second, it does not require the monetary authority to have additional information that could be of a private nature 11 .
At 0 t = , the initial-old generation behaves as any old agent from the future generations would. In particular, a fraction ( ) 1 λ − of these initial old individuals would be of the patient type, and, thus, would like to consume now. In standard models with overlapping generations, the initial conditions of the economy describe the initial stock of the different assets that exist in the economy, and they play a key role. Typically, the initial stocks of outside assets indicate the "endowments" of the members of the generation of initial old individuals .In the present case, there are two initial conditions: 0 0 M > and 0 0 Q > are given, and they are distributed equally among the patient initial old such that each has the equivalent of ( ) ( )
Financial Intermediation
In our model, foreign banks play the somehow impersonal role of suppliers of international liquidity through foreign-credit instruments that may take different forms. Thus, the private banking sector in equilibrium is a net debtor of the rest of the world. Domestic banks follow the standard D-D set up: a representative bank arises endogenously and pools together the resources owned by households with the purpose of providing them with partial insurance against the uncertainty of their potential types and with feasible allocations that are Pareto superior to autarky 12 . In the context of a small, open economy, domestic households may also benefit from pooling their resources and acting together whenever such economy does not display aggregate uncertainty, as is the case in our model economy.
Following the standard practice in the literature, a representative bank that starts business at date t will behave so that it maximizes the expected utility of the individual households born at date t , given by equation
(1), which is also in the bank's best interest as well. Henceforth, when we use the term "banks" without further qualification, we refer to domestic banks starting business at t .
Access to Foreign Credit Markets.
Only banks may access the world credit markets by trading with foreign banks in several primary debt markets, the idea being that the debt-instruments available may provide them with liquidity in a variety of terms and/or dates of maturity.
Banks have access to three different foreign-debt instruments. The amounts traded of the different instruments form the debt-structure vector denoted by ( )
, ,
, where all amounts are expressed in terms of the single good 13 . The vector of relevant prices associated with this debt-structure is time-invariant, and it is denoted by ( ) 
1, 1 2, 1 1 f > are time-invariant and measured in terms of the single good. They are chosen exogenously by foreign banks, and represent the maximum foreign credit available at dates t and 1 t + , respectively. (3a) and (3b) limit the total amount of foreign debt standing at each date, and we restrict our attention to allocations where (3a) and (3b) bind, so that foreign credit is rationed.
Fractional-Reserves Banking and Multiple Reserve Requirements.
Multiple and unremunerated reserve requirements in our model follow Hernandez-Verme (2004.) All investment is done by banks and it is subject to 12 See the section on deposit contracts for more details. Notice also that the intermediation equilibrium is not Pareto optimal since early liquidation is costly. 13 This treatment is standard in the literature. For the reader interested in the analysis of nominal debt denominated in different currencies, see Freeman and Tabellini (1998), Chang ( ) and Hernandez-Verme (2008.) the financial regulations of the domestic country. Out of the total deposits, a fraction must be held as currency reserves and only the remainder can be invested. A part of the currency reserves must be held in the form of wons, while the rest must be denominated in US dollars. In particular, the policy parameter ( ) 
The afternoon of date t : Individual agents learn their types in the early afternoon of time t. Impatient agents will withdraw 1,t c goods and consume them, while a patient agent would not withdraw, provided (2) holds.
Banks need to pay withdrawals in the amount of 
Deposit Contracts. Domestic individual agents face uncertainty about the type they will become at the end of their youth. Moreover, once realized, this information is private to each individual agent. Under these circumstances, the representative bank aims to protect itself by using some kind of self-selection mechanism.
Such a mechanism is designed to give individual agents the right incentives to behave according to their true type. In our particular case, this mechanism takes the form of the truth-telling constraint given by the inequality in (2) . The severity of this private information problem in a particular state of the world will determine whether (2) will bind or not. For our convenience, henceforth, all of our analysis will refer to the general case of a generation born at date t, unless we explicitly say otherwise.
Autarkic Equilibrium. In the absence of financial intermediation, individuals cannot benefit from pooling their resources and there are no insurance schemes available to them. Thus, they could save only through their investment/storage technology. When the information about types is realized at the end of their youth, individual agents in autarky face a feasible set in the space of state-contingent commodities ( ) 
Conducting Monetary Policy under Floating Exchange Rates
In this model economy with flexible exchange rates, the monetary authority prioritizes two important aspects when conducting monetary policy: 1) the setting of the rate of domestic money growth, and 2) the choice of the appropriate backing of the domestic money supply with foreign-reserve assets 16 .
In the case of the first aspect, the growth rate of the domestic money supply becomes a tool of monetary policy of the utmost importance, as opposed to situations where the money supply is subordinated to other primarily chosen policy objectives. Many reasons may explain the special interest on this policy tool, other than the obvious --controlling the evolution of the domestic money supply--. First, it contributes to the control, up to some degree, over the determination of inflation rates, especially --but not only--in the long-run. Second, it is a mean of giving or taking away incentives to the actors involved with real activity -in our case, financial activity.
Third, it can influence the formation of public expectations by keeping reasonable stable rates of inflation as well as the value of the national currency. We adopt the simplest scenario for our model economy, which contemplates the choice and setting, once-and-for-all, of a constant rate of money growth. Such a policy sets the evolution of the supply of wons by the rule
where 1 σ > − is the exogenous and constant rate of domestic money growth, chosen by the domestic monetary authority. The latter injects/withdraws money through lump-sum transfers to all young agents in the amount of t τ goods each.
With respect to the second aspect, backing the domestic money supply is by itself a precautionary mechanism aimed to protecting this economy against potential reversals in the World financial market. This is also of key importance, given the significant amount of action this country has in foreign credit markets.
Typically, the monetary authority chooses and sets a fixed fraction of the money supply to be backed or guaranteed. Then, the backing takes the form of holdings of foreign, interest-bearing reserve assets in an amount equal to the dollar-value of this chosen fraction of the supply. This, of course, aims to stabilize the perceived value of money and the willingness of the public to hold it. Thus, the monetary authority holds 
where
is the exogenous and constant fraction of the dollar-value of the supply of wons backed by the monetary authority. This policy is a variation of the one used in Hernandez-Verme (2004) 17 .
We now define ( ) 
Notice that equation (9) is a linear first order difference equation that describes the evolution of the real monetary transfer ( t τ ,) and that its dynamic behavior is inherited from t z .
General Equilibrium under Floating Exchange Rates
In the remainder of this section, we use a ^ over the values of the different endogenous variables that belong to a floating exchange rate regime. Several sets of conditions must be satisfied simultaneously. We list them below.
First, there are two conditions on international transactions that apply to our small open economy. One, since the single good is homogeneous across countries and there are no restrictions on the international trade of goods, it follows that purchasing power parity must hold, and, moreover, that the market-determined exchange rate t e adjusts to ensure this condition is satisfied. Thus, we have *t t t e p p ⋅ = .
( 1 0 a ) Also, we confine our attention to vectors of prices of foreign debt ( )
r r r >> that satisfy the following no arbitrage condition, which controls for the different maturities of the three foreign-debt instruments:
Second, there are two constrains on the rates of return in this economy that imply that the reserve requirements are binding. This transpires when the following two conditions hold:
Third, we have all the conditions associated with the market for wons. One, the domestic price level t p clears the market for domestic real money balances:
The latter, in turn, leads to the equilibrium return of domestic real money balances
Fourth, there is the market for foreign currency. This market clears when
In equilibrium, t q and * t b are governed by the following two equations
( ) ( )
Moreover, the endogenous growth rate of the supply of dollars in the domestic economy is given by
while the nominal exchange rate follows: 
, where
. Next, the withdrawals offered by banks to impatient and patient individuals in equilibrium are, respectively 
where the intercept is given by
. The reduced-form coefficients are given by c c + will depend on the particular set the equilibria belong to.
Multiplicity and Indeterminacy of Stationary Equilibria under Floating Exchange Rates
In this section, we discuss the set of separating stationary equilibria. These equilibria are such that: 1) there are no misrepresentations of types; 2) there are no problems of liquidity, and 3) there is no early liquidation of the long-term investment by banks. Before we proceed we must point the following: there is what we call a "core"
of variables that are independent of the foreign interest rates, and another set that contains foreign debt and statecontingent commodities that are determined as a result.
The Core in a Stationary Equilibrium. The core consists of a vector of five key variables: ( )
, , ,
These five variables are always determinate in equilibrium, since they do not depend on the interest rates ( )
, , r r r . Interestingly, the core dynamic system is de-coupled, inheriting its dynamics from ˆt z . Notice that, under floating exchange rates, x represents the steady-state value of the endogenous variable x . Thus, the stationary core can be found in the five equations that follow:
σ φ θ and that, as expected, q is increasing in f φ . In addition, τ is nonlinear in both σ and d φ but monotonically increasing in θ . Finally, k is increasing in σ , but nonlinear in ( )
With respect to the steady-state returns on domestic and foreign real money balances, the growth of the nominal exchange rate and the growth rate of the real exchange rate, they are all constant and equal to ( ) Foreign Debt in a Stationary Equilibrium. The amount that banks borrow from abroad is constant and nonnegative in a stationary equilibrium, for all types of foreign debt-instrument, provided, of course that (10b) holds. Thus, the structure of foreign debt of a bank in a steady-state equilibrium is given by the triplet
This stationary debt structure vector permits us to calculate the current account balance in a stationary equilibrium:
We must remark that the deficit of the current account in stationary equilibria poses significant doubt on the long-run viability of this economy, as one might expect. ∈ R follows directly by using (14c) and (14d). The particular type of equilibrium and its properties will depend on the composition of the vector ( )
We discuss this issue as we go along.
Existence and Local Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibria. Before discussing fully the issue of existence, we must discuss the different types of equilibria that may arise 18 , based on the properties of the structure of foreign debt issued by domestic banks. We will observe multiple stationary equilibria in this model economy with floating exchange rates. There are three cases, which we discuss below. The second subscript on variables denotes Case j, where , , , r r r σ = ∈ P R to be the space of bifurcation parameters under a floating exchange rate regime. Bifurcation values of these parameters partition P into three subsets with defining characteristics that we describe below. Subset 1= 1 P : Existence of Case 1 Equilibria. Given ε as defined in the Appendix, the two mutually exclusive conditions must hold for equilibria of Case 1 to exist:
• Condition 1: ˆ0 ε > must hold.
• Condition 2: when ˆ0 ε < obtains, Table 2 summarizes the results on existence of stationary equilibria, and presents as well how the scope of existence varies with σ . It is apparent that the stationary allocations of state-contingent commodities
The issue of multiple equilibria raises a new set of questions related to the properties of local uniqueness and determinacy, which focus on the mapping from allocations to prices in equilibrium. The practice in standard General Equilibrium theory is the construction of a particular economic environment with the aim of ensuring that the equilibria are "regular," which means that: 1) the number of equilibria is finite, and, 2) there is a one-to-one mapping between the vectors of relative prices and the excess demand function in a neighborhood of the equilibrium allocation. However, our model economy violates the two conditions of regularity. First, there is typically a continuum of equilibria. Second, the mapping between the vectors of relative prices and the excess demand correspondence is not one-to-one. Thus, steady-state equilibria in our economy are "irregular," and thus, they are not locally unique nor they are determinate.
Let us illustrate the nature of the irregularity in our model economy. Note that the core in the steady-
, , , z q b k τ is always unique and determinate, since it is not associated with the vector ( )
However, for a fixed point in the parameter-space, and for each stationary debt-structure vector ( )
that belongs to case j there is typically a continuum of vectors of interest rates satisfying the equilibrium conditions. To fix ideas, let us discuss briefly the equilibrium in Case 1, in which this issue appears to be a little simpler. Here, the debt-structure ( )
is unique. However, as the reader can observe in Figure 1 , there is a continuum of vector prices ( )
, , r r r R = that satisfy the equilibrium conditions, and is associated with the allocation ( )
. This is illustrated by the thick gray line on the plane * 2 r R = , which defines the set of possible equilibrium price vectors. The range of ( )
, , r r r in an equilibrium that belongs to Case 1 depends on the following three boundary functions:
Stationary equilibria exist when
Turning back to the general case, we must emphasize that the indeterminacy of equilibria in this case goes two ways: 1) for a given vector ( )
there is a continuum of vectors ( )
, , r r r consistent with equilibrium conditions; and 2) for a given vector ( )
r r r , there may be more than one vector ( )
consistent with equilibrium. Moreover, these vectors may belong to each of the different cases. As an example, it is possible that one vector may belong to Case 1, one or more to Case 2 and another one to Case 3.
Dynamic Equilibria under a Floating Exchange Rate Regime
The dynamic system for this economy has three parts: the core dynamic system, the dynamic system for the debt-structure vector ( )
, and the dynamic system for the space-contingent commodities ( ) 1, 2, 1, t t c c + . Obviously, the latter will depend on the arrangement of foreign debt and the particular case the equilibrium belongs to. We illustrate the configuration of causality relationships in Figure 2 .
The Core Dynamic System with Floating. The core dynamic system in equilibrium involves the five core variables ( ) 
ii) The interaction between all the policy parameters and the nature of the dynamics is highly complex.
Interestingly, there are many different sub-regions in the parameter-space that determine characteristic dynamic properties. As an example, we illustrate the case of the eigenvalue ( ) ( ) Table 3 . The reader may see that there are many different restrictions/combinations of parameters that yield monotonic dynamics, a unit root or monotonic divergence.
The Dynamic System of the Debt-Structure under Floating. We now turn to discuss the dynamics of the debt-structure vector that result from a floating exchange rate regime. Below, we discuss each case.
Foreign-Debt Dynamics in Cases 1 and 3: the equilibrium debt-structure in either of these extreme cases is stationary. On the first hand, the composition of foreign credit in Case 1 is given by 
Equation (17) is a second order, nonlinear, difference equation in ˆt z . We first augment the state-space by using 1t t y z + = , which reduces the order of the system: it becomes a first order dynamic system in ( )
Local Stability Analysis. We took a First Order Taylor approximation around the steady-state. The trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix associated with this system in the steady-state are continuous monotonic functions of the parameters, and given by the expressions:
It is apparent, from (18b), that the pair of eigenvalues has the same sign. Notice that ( ) Tr J is a monotonically decreasing function of σ and
( )
Det J is a monotonically increasing function of σ , while the discriminant
and eigenvalues are highly nonlinear in the same parameter. Moreover, the world inflation rate and the policy parameters interact with the rate of domestic money growth, altering the dynamic properties of the system. We now describe how the dynamic properties of the long-term debt and bifurcations change as we contemplate scenarios with different combinations of parameters 19 . In particular, we present first the "baseline sequence" in Proposition 3, which describes how the dynamic properties of the long-term debt vary with the rate of domestic money growth in the baseline scenario. Next, for ( )
, , , 1 r r r r , we describe how the baseline sequence changes with different values of a particular parameter. For our convenience, we define the following notation: (+) sink is a sink with positive eigenvalues, (-) sink is a sink with negative eigenvalues, (-) saddle is a saddle with a negative stable eigenvalue, (-) source is a source with negative eigenvalues, (+) complex-stable indicates complex conjugates with a positive real part that is less than one, (-) complex-stable indicates complex conjugates with a negative real part that is less than one, and (-) complex-unstable indicates complex conjugates with a real part that is negative and outside the unit circle.
Proposition 3
The baseline sequence as a function of σ under floating exchange rates consists of: (+) sink, (+) complex-stable, (-) complex-stable, (-) complex-unstable, (-) source and (-) saddle. This means that for values of σ that are low enough, the steady-state 2 d is a sink with positive eigenvalues; as σ increases, the eigenvalues become complex conjugates with a positive and stable real part that next turns into a negative stable real part, displaying cyclical and non-cyclical stable fluctuations; with higher values of σ , the real part of complex conjugates become negative and unstable, displaying unstable cyclical oscillations; as σ continues to increase, the steady-state becomes a source with large and negative eigenvalues, dynamic equilibria are unstable and display large and exploding non-cyclical fluctuations along dynamic paths; finally, for values of the rate of domestic money growth that are high enough, the steady state becomes a saddle with non-cyclical stable fluctuations along the stable manifold. The scope for determinacy dominates, but so does the scope for endogenously arising volatility.
Proposition 3 illustrates the rich dynamics of long-term debt in Case 2. Market-generated volatility is always present and dominates the dynamic paths. We now describe how the sequence just described varies with different parameters. Because of their length, we do not present the following results in a Proposition.
The Dynamic System of the Space-Contingent Commodities. We now turn to discuss the properties of the pair ( ) equations (14c) and (14d), which inherit their dynamics from the dynamic system of the debt-structure. We first discuss the dynamic properties of consumption by impatient agents for the different cases of equilibria, and we follow with the analysis of the consumption by patient agents. Below, we start our discussion of each case. 
Summary:
We now summarize the results obtained along the equilibrium dynamic paths. There is a nontrivial scope for complex eigenvalues that contributes to both cyclical and non-cyclical fluctuations; in some cases, the fluctuations can be significantly large and explosive. The scope for stability --and indeterminacy--is typically small, and the scope for determinacy typically dominates, but fluctuations are observed on the stable manifold.
Moreover, unstable and oscillating divergence is observed in general. The reserve requirements play the role of stabilizing, at least partially, the dynamic equilibria in this model economy, while backing the domestic supply plays the opposite role. Thus, these results provide us with policy recommendations: to implement high and binding reserve requirements, but keeping the backing of the money supply to a minimum. In the extreme case of 0 θ = , the order of the dynamic system is reduced, which one can interpret as the ultimate stabilization of dynamic equilibria.
Fixed Exchange Rates: the Case of Malaysia
In this section, we consider a small, open economy that replicates the case of Malaysia at the time of the crisis 20 .
This economy is identical to the economy discussed in Section 2 in every respect but the exchange rate regime and associated monetary policy: this second model economy operates under a fixed rather than a flexible exchange rate regime. We still focus on separating equilibria with truth-telling where crises cannot occur. As in Hernandez-Verme (2004), we construct this fixed exchange rate regime such that a currency board emerges as a special case 21 , and we restrict our attention to the study of equilibria under a very hard peg where the fixed exchange rate remains constant, as opposed to intermediate pegs. We continue to use the won as the domestic currency and the US dollar as the foreign, international currency.
Monetary Policy under Fixed Exchange Rates
In this model economy with a very hard peg, the monetary authority has different priorities as to the aspects of monetary policy rules to be implemented. In the first place, policymakers worry about the setting, once-and-forall, of the nominal exchange rate at the initial date. Second, the maintenance and sustainability of the peg by choosing the appropriate backing of the domestic money supply with holdings of foreign-reserve assets. Notice that the policy of binding reserve requirements is still in place.
With respect to the setting of the nominal exchange rate, we let 0 e > denote, without loss of generality, the time-invariant and exogenous nominal exchange rate set by the monetary authority at the initial date, t=0. It is essential, under this policy, that the central bank must stand ready to buy or sell foreign currency at the fixed exchange rate, causing the domestic money supply to change as needed to meet this target. The latter implies that the nominal supply of domestic currency is endogenous: by fixing the nominal exchange rate, the monetary authority gives up full control of t M , and we say that the monetary policy is subordinated 22 . The withdrawals/injection of domestic currency (wons), as in Section 2, are accomplished through the monetary lump-sum transfers in the amount of t τ goods to the ex ante identical young agents There are many reasons that explain the choice of a fixed nominal exchange rates regime in spite of the lack of an independent monetary policy. Among them, we must mention that, under a very hard peg, the domestic country inherits the world inflation rate, contributing to a relatively quick stabilization and reduction of domestic rates of inflation. This 20 It is possible to argue as well that the model in this section not only represents the Malaysian economy, but also the Hong-Kong economy. We do not take a stand in this respect. 21 A currency board requires two elements: a fixed exchange rate regime and 1 θ = . 22 The reader may recall "Tinbergen's principle": for each policy goal, one policy tool is needed. This principle applies very well to this case. In general, one cannot hope to attend to two or more different goals by using only one policy tool to achieve both. In this particular case, the monetary authority shall not expect to keep the nominal exchange rate fixed and constant, and, at the same time, keep the control of the money supply, since this would imply that there are two goals but only one monetary policy tool available (the money supply.) also helps promote the credibility of this policy, in general, and the monetary authority, in particular, among the general public.
The monetary authority may also choose to hold reserves in the form of interest-bearing, foreign-reserve assets. This rule takes the same form than in Section 2. However, the general purpose of this policy rule is somehow different under fixed exchange rates. These reserve-holdings aim to back the dollar-value of the domestic money supply but with the purpose instead of meeting the needs of the public who wants to buy or sell foreign currency at the fixed exchange rate e , so that speculative attacks on the domestic currency can be avoided or at least minimized. Thus, this rule also contributes to the sustainability of the very hard peg in place.
We continue to use the same notation in as much as possible. Notice that, at the same time at date 0, the monetary authority sets both e and θ . Next, we modify equation (8) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (21) represents the real value of any changes in the nominal supply needed to sustain the fixed nominal exchange rate. The second term indicates the effects of any changes in the real foreign-reserve position of the government.
General Equilibrium in a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
In the remainder of this section, we use t x to denote the value that the endogenous variable t x takes under a hard peg. The general equilibrium under fixed exchange rates is also very complex. We try to shorten our presentation, and, thus, we continue to proceed by groups, while we substitute equations when necessary.
First, the restrictions on international transactions, equations (10a) and (10b) still hold: purchasing power parity and no arbitrage, respectively. Second, domestic and foreign currencies must be dominated in rate of return for the reserve requirements to be binding, implying that (11a) and (11b) still hold.
Third, regarding the market for wons, the condition (12a) still holds. However, the rate of return on real won balances changes significantly under a hard peg, and we substitute equation (12b) by the equation reflecting the lack of control of the domestic money supply. Accordingly, the equilibrium laws of motion in equations (12c) and (12d) must be modified as well, and the following two equations obtain:
where the coefficients are ( )
. Notice that equations (22c) and (22d) are first order linear difference equations in t τ . We must remark again that, under this hard peg, the dynamics of the system originates in t τ instead of t z , as it was the case under floating exchange rates.
We now turn to the market for foreign currency in our fourth group. Obviously, the market clearing condition (13a) still holds, but we must modify the equilibrium laws of motion in equations (13b) and (13c) to represent the hard peg instead. Thus, the following two equilibrium laws of motion obtain:
where ( ) ( ) 
The previous equation reflects the fixed and time invariant nominal exchange rate in this policy regime.
The last group of equilibrium conditions has to do with the deposit contract offered by banks under this regime. One, the self-selection constraint in (2) holds. Two, the constraints on foreign credit in (14a) continue to bind. Three, the equilibrium law of motion for the long-term investment in this new regime is now given by ( ) ( ) . Four, the total return on domestic currency reserves and foreign currency reserves under this policy regime are given, respectively, by the following two equations: 
where the coefficients are Six and last, the definition of the current account balance given in equation (14e) still holds.
We want to highlight two issues, at this time: 1) all the reduced-form coefficients are a function now of * σ , but * σ is not a policy parameter since it is determined in the world market; 2) the structure of the general equilibrium system under fixed exchange rates shares the general structure of causality. In particular, all the dynamics originates from 1 t τ − , and we observe the same set of core variables ( ) Figure 3 illustrates these details, in order to facilitate the reader's comprehension and insight of this second model economy.
Multiplicity and Indeterminacy of Stationary Equilibria under a Hard Peg
In this section, we discuss the set of separating stationary equilibria that obtain from a fixed exchange regime.
In these equilibria, all agents behave according to their true type and there are no problems of liquidity. We will proceed by first characterizing the core in steady-state equilibria. Next, we characterize the stationary debtstructure vectors and the steady-state vectors, which define the stationary space-contingent commodities.
The Core in the Steady-State Equilibrium. The five variables that belong to the core, ( )
, , , ,
also determinate under a fixed exchange rate regime whenever an equilibrium exists, since they do no depend on the foreign interest rates ( )
r r r . We impose stationarity on equations (22c), (22d), (23b), (23c) and (24a), and obtain the steady-state values for the variables in the core that we display in the following five expressions:
Here, ( ) 
Foreign Debt in a Stationary Equilibrium.
It is also the case that the amount borrowed by banks from the rest of the world is constant and non-negative in a stationary equilibrium, regardless of the type of foreign debt instrument and provided that there is no arbitrage of the interest rates. The same three cases for equilibria still apply, and thus, the structure of foreign debt of a bank in a steady-state equilibrium that belongs to Case j is given by the triplet ( ) 
As before, the stationary debt-structure vector permits us to calculate the current account balance in a stationary equilibrium that belongs to Case j :
Notice that, under this policy as well, there is always a long-run deficit in the current account balance, which troubles the concept of long-run sustainability of this regime.
A stationary equilibrium under fixed exchange rates then is defined by the allocation ∈ R follows directly from the debt-structure
Of course, the particular type of equilibrium that arises and its properties will depend on the composition of the vector ( )
, as we will see below when we check the conditions for existence, uniqueness and determinacy.
Existence and Local Uniqueness under a Fixed Exchange Rate
Regime. In our model economy with a fixed exchange rate regime, domestic and foreign inflation are always equal, even in non-stationary allocations. In particular, in situations where the world inflation rate is high (low,) banks would have no (strong) incentives to borrow long-term funds from abroad because inflation would undermine (boost) the real return of the currency reserves that banks must use when such debt is due. Moreover, different combinations of foreign interest rates and world inflation may produce a variety of situations that translate into different equilibrium sets, since both foreign interest rates and world inflation represent costs that banks must face. Notice that high rates of world inflation may exacerbate the effect of the foreign interest rates, and thus, we focus on the role that Q is smaller than 1 P , thus reducing the likeliness of borrowing large amounts long-term in equilibrium with respect to floating exchange rates. Thus, the nature of the absence of local uniqueness and determinacy is very similar to what we observe under floating exchange rates, saving of course different particulars and details such as the different role played by the world inflation rate in both regimes. The existence of the steady-state equilibria under both floating and fixed exchange rate regimes is strongly conditioned on the domestic policy parameter σ , for floating exchange rates, and the world inflation rate * σ for a fixed exchange rate regime. In general, when one compares such two economies, * σ σ ≠ would be typically observed. The latter implies that, a priori, the scopes for existence and indeterminacy are different, to some extent, under alternative exchange rate regimes. However, these properties cannot be compared strictly without additional information, making the task of ranking the alternative regimes in this respect somewhat difficult.
Dynamic Equilibria under a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the dynamics originates from the monetary authority's budget constraint, and the fact that both the money supply and the holdings of foreign-reserve assets must adjust to keep the nominal exchange rate at its set level, 0 e > . Next, we proceed by steps: we start with the core in dynamic equilibria, followed by foreign-debt dynamics, and we conclude with the dynamics of the state-contingent commodities.
The Core Dynamic System under a Hard Peg. The core dynamic system consists of the first order difference equations (22c), (22d), (23b), (23c) and (24a). Moreover, the dynamic system of the core is a de-coupled system where the dynamics is inherited from t τ (see The Dynamic System of the Debt-Structure under a Hard Peg. We now turn to discuss the composition and dynamic properties of the foreign-debt vector in dynamic equilibria that result from a fixed exchange rate regime.
Below, we start our discussion of each case.
Foreign-Debt Dynamics in Cases 1 and 3: the equilibrium debt-structure in either of these extreme cases is stationary, as it was also the case under floating. Interestingly, the debt-structure vectors under a hard peg are equal to their counterparts under floating. In particular, in Case 1, we observe that σ sufficiently close to 1 − . As * σ increases, the eigenvalue comes to lie inside the unit circle, with damped oscillations around the steady-state that turn gradually into stable monotonic dynamics when * σ is sufficiently large.
In the Appendix, we show how the latter baseline sequence changes with alternative combinations of parameters and rates of return. 
Discussion: Equilibrium-Stability Properties under Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes.
We now summarize the results obtained along dynamic paths with a fixed exchange rate regime, and compare them against their equivalent under floating exchange rates. In the first place, all dynamic systems under a hard peg have first order difference equations, eliminating the possibility of cyclical fluctuations in the debt-structure vector that are typically associated with complex eigenvalues. Second, regarding the core, the full spectrum dynamics can be observed under fixed, while floating allowed only for monotonic dynamics; the latter implies that a fixed exchange rate regime promotes endogenously-arising volatility around the stationary core, while floating does not. There is a trade-off, however, vis-à-vis the foreign-debt structure and the state-contingent consumption: floating promotes higher order and very complicated dynamics that allow for nontrivial regions with complex eigenvalues in which cyclical and non-cyclical fluctuations are intertwined. In some cases, fluctuations can be significantly large and explosive, and the volatility may arise from a very large and unstable real part together with explosively-large and diverging amplitude of the cyclical component. A hard peg, instead, prevents the latter from occurring, and there is only a very small range for first order, simpler oscillating dynamics. Finally, the policy recommendations vary drastically across regimes: i) high and binding reserve requirements promote and extend the stability of dynamic equilibria under floating, while the only preserve stability and prevent monotonic divergence under fixed; ii) the backing of the money supply is a de-stabilizing policy parameter under floating, but it promotes stability under fixed; iii) the policy recommendations are exact opposites; floating requires very high reserve requirements and a very low backing of the money supply but an economy with fixed exchange regime is better-off with a combination of very low reserve requirements and a very high backing of the money supply.
Potential for Crises and the Vulnerability of Banks
In sections 2 and 3, we studied the case where uncertainty was absent from our model economy, but there were alternative exchange rate regimes in place. We observed that domestic agents would withdraw from banks according to their true types, and domestic banks would anticipate this perfectly (i.e., there are no bank runs in equilibrium). Interestingly, not only banks would not liquidate early the long-term asset in equilibrium, but all the banks would be liquid and solvent. In particular, at the beginning of date t, the domestic banks would have chosen the state-contingent consumption vector ( ) dream" in which banks will close, but without any change to the fundamentals of the economy. Interestingly, there is a coordination problem in our model economy in which complementarity is present in the strategic interaction between the individual depositors: if individual agents cannot observe the actions or types of others, they may panic if they believe that everyone in the economy has had the same bad dream. In other words, if an individual depositor believes that everybody else is going to run and banks have a sequential service constraint in place, she will run as well, and, in the aggregate, all depositors will run on banks 23 . In particular, whether depositors choose to run or not will be determined by the results they obtain from the sequential checking mechanism, which is shown in Figure 4 . This mechanism is informationally efficient and it is defined as the algorithm followed by domestic depositors, in which they check several conditions related to the banks'
positions. In the event of a shock, banks do not get a chance to re-optimize, since there is no change in the fundamentals of the economy, but all domestic depositors may run on the banks to withdraw their resources immediately --aiming at being the first in line--and the financial system would have a fully blown self-fulfilling attack on banks in its hands. As we will see later in detail, there exists a particular set of circumstances under which this "bad dream" has the potential of greatly affecting the outcomes in the economy by leading to panicequilibria with significantly lower welfare.
Intrinsic uncertainty is the second type of uncertainty that we explore in this paper. It has to do with an 
where 1, 1 t d + denotes the re-optimized value of 1, 1 t d + , since the latter is not feasible after the shock. We will see later in this section that this intrinsic shock may reduce both liquidity and solvency in the financial sector 24 , thus having the potential of triggering a domestic crisis that may take the form of generalized attacks on banks, bankruptcy and closure in the domestic financial system. 23 The reader may also be interested in suspension of convertibility as a measure that could preclude a bank run from happening. However, we only focus in the simplest case here. 24 One could also argue that unanticipated reductions in foreign credit may trigger a shock to the preferences of depositors. If such a shock induces a crisis of a self-fulfilling nature, this may only exacerbate the existing problems in this economy. In this paper, for simplicity, we abstract from this possibility.
Once such a shock hits the economy, this event becomes public information and the availability of future resources changes irreversibly. Under this new set of circumstances, it may be in the depositors' best interest to withdraw from banks as much as possible immediately, and the presence of a sequential service constraint may only exacerbate this problem. In these circumstances, it may not be optimal for any agent -specially, agents of the patient type--to wait until the next date to withdraw from the banks, since they believe that banks could be facing bankruptcy and closure. Both banks and depositors will need to re-optimize to account for the change in circumstances, leading again to the Sequential Checking Mechanism. This algorithm consists of three steps. The first step is an evaluation of the liquidity position of banks. Next, evaluating the banks' solvency becomes the next priority, followed by checking whether the resulting allocations are incentive-compatible or not.
The Sequential Checking Mechanism
Checking Liquidity. Chang and Velasco (2000a , 2000b were among the first in the literature to mention the need to evaluate the liquidity position of banks in the context of financial crises in the emerging markets, and we follow them in this paper. The illiquidity condition summarizes the current situation of banks after a shock hits the domestic economy at the end of date t, assuming that a bank cannot commit not to liquidate fully the long-term investment if needed. We now describe this condition.
On the one hand, if all the depositors decided to withdraw their deposits, the real value of the bank's short-term obligations due at the end of date t would be 
Of course, when the inequality in (33) does not obtain, we say that the bank has a liquid position.
Checking Solvency. One of our main points is that an illiquid position is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a bank-run equilibrium to obtain in our model. The banks' illiquidity may only be a temporary matter caused by the shock that could be solved if foreign lenders would provide them with a provisional bail-out in the amount of
The following inequality describes the condition for the insolvency of a representative bank at the end of date t:
The inequality in (34) means that if the real value of the new short-term foreign debt 1, 1 t d + (i.e., the bail out) is enough to alleviate the temporary problem of liquidity, then it would be in the best interest of the foreign creditors to help this bank out instead of forcing it to close, so that they can still recover at least the amount 2, 1 t d + that they lent long-term to domestic banks at the beginning of date t .The rule followed by foreign creditors would be to bail out solvent banks, but let the insolvent ones close. We can summarize this idea with the following saying: "why throw away good money after bad money?"
Checking Incentive Compatibility. In a situation where banks are illiquid but solvent, it is still possible that a fraction of the patient agents may still have incentives to misrepresent their type and withdraw early, leading to panics and closure. Thus, we incorporate a last step in this algorithm, by which individual depositors check whether the Incentive Compatibility constraint in (2) is satisfied or not.
We now summarize the actions that individual depositors and foreign creditors take, depending on the results they obtain in the steps of this algorithm. First, in a case where (33) does not obtain, banks have liquid positions and no further checking is needed: domestic depositors will choose not run on banks. Second, in cases where (33) and (34) hold, banks are illiquid and insolvent: foreign creditors will not bail banks out 25 and domestic depositors will run on banks. Third, when (33) and (2) hold, but (34) is not satisfied, it is in the foreign creditors' best interest to bail banks out, and depositors choose not to run on banks. Finally, when (33) holds but (34) and (2) do not, foreign creditors will not bail banks out, and domestic depositors will find it in their best interest to run on banks.
Type of Equilibria and Re-optimization
After a shock hits our model economy, banks may need to formulate a new plan. In the case of extrinsic uncertainty, then ( After the sudden stop hits the domestic financial sector, this news is public, and everybody realizes that the amount of new borrowing from abroad is less than it was when they formulated their original plans.
Fortunately, people can still try to behave optimally by sequentially checking the situation of the banks. Thus, the need to re-optimize and re-formulate their plans triggers a new sequential checking to try to determine the best course of action under the new circumstances, and equilibria obtain accordingly. The new borrowing constraint faced by banks at the end of period t implies that
The sequential checking mechanism now requires re-evaluating (33), (34) and (2) by taking into account (35) as well. Banks now try to maximize the expected utility in (1) by choosing only ( )
, subject to the new budget constraint in (35), the other relevant budget constraints and the exchange rate regime in place.
Early Liquidation and Existence of Equilibria after a Sudden Stop
Henceforth, we focus on stationary allocations where
obtains. We now describe the new equilibria that result after re-optimization and the sequential checking process. Before proceeding, we must point out that, at the time of the shock, the variables (5) and (6) 
We must point out a couple of interesting things from (36a-b). First, l is monotonically decreasing in ' 1 f , which ensures that a positive amount of early liquidation in equilibrium, after the economy is hit by a sudden stop. Second, l is also a monotonically decreasing function of 2 d , indicating that economies that borrow larger amounts long-term will experience smaller amounts of early liquidation of the long-term investment. It follows directly that 1 2 3 0 l l l < < < holds.
When the sudden stop of foreign credit hits the economy, the anxious domestic depositors and foreign creditors start checking the bank's capacity of operation. Under illiquidity, the credit crunch among foreign creditors will directly impact the bank's solvency. We summarize our results in Table 4 . In particular, in order to determine the type of equilibrium, we must find the appropriate regions in the space of foreign interest rates and monetary policy parameters where liquidity, solvency and self-selection intersect. As we pointed out before, equilibria of Type 4 yield the lowest social welfare possible -even worse than autarky, and they can be considered an outcome that the society as a whole will be willing to prevent. The latter obtains only when the banks are illiquid and lack solvency at the same time, and the bank will close and claim a bankruptcy. Otherwise, panic equilibria exist only when the outcomes are not incentive-compatible. In what follows, we proceed by first classifying the equilibria into the three possible cases that we have examined before, and then examine the scope for existence of non-panic and panic equilibria in each subset of the parameter space. Whether a particular type of equilibria obtains or not will depend on the amount of the sudden stop, i.e. In Case 1, banks borrow a relatively large amount of foreign long-term debt ( ) To sum up, the economy may pivot from Type 1 (with the highest social welfare) to Type 3 (with the second to lowest social welfare) due to infinitesimal changes in 1 f ′ and/or in policy parameters, illustrating the very fragile and highly volatile environment faced by the financial system, which could lead to panics and generalized bankruptcy. The good news is that the worst type of panic equilibria are ruled out under either exchange rate regimes. The bad news is that the best of non-panic equilibria cannot be obtained when
holds. The recommendation to the banks in the small open economy seems to be to borrow either a lot or nothing long-term. Anywhere in between (Case 2) will eliminate the best type of equilibria.
Evaluation of the Role of the Policy (under revision)
Through out the paper, it has become evident that our model provides a suitable framework for analyzing the interaction among various types of monetary policies: controlling the domestic rate of money growth, inflation targeting, fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes, regulations of multiple reserve requirements and so forth.
In this section, we illustrate how changes in policy parameters alter the ranges of existence for the different types of equilibria that we have discussed so far. Tables 5, 6 and 7 show our results for all the different cases and exchange rate regimes.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate whether a particular monetary policy can help prevent financial crises that originate in illiquid positions by banks. We then compare the advantages and disadvantages of alternative de facto exchange rate regimes in achieving economy stability. Finally, we evaluate the impact that a policy of multiple reserve requirements can have on the scope for existence of equilibria that are not vulnerable to crises.
In order to call attention to the questions that we are interested in, we built a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small, open economy that displays nontrivial demands for fiat currencies, unexpected sunspots, and financial/banking crises originated by sudden stops of foreign capital inflows. We motivated the effective demands for domestic and foreign fiat money with a policy of holding reserves of different national currencies. These reserves prevent banks from financing domestic investment, but they may also provide banks with access to liquid resources in their time of need. Under some particular circumstances, reserve requirements may reduce the likelihood of observing equilibria with illiquid and insolvent banks.
In situations where no crises are present, we observe that the monetary rule in place determines up to an important extent the existence and properties of equilibria. Typically, there is a continuum of stationary equilibria, and local uniqueness and determinacy are lacking. With respect to dynamic equilibria under floating exchange rates, there is a nontrivial scope for complex eigenvalues that contributes to both cyclical and noncyclical fluctuations; in some cases, the fluctuations can be significantly large and explosive. The scope for stability --and indeterminacy--is typically small, and the scope for determinacy typically dominates, but fluctuations are observed on the stable manifold. Moreover, unstable and oscillating divergence is observed in general. The reserve requirements play the role of stabilizing, at least partially, the dynamic equilibria in this model economy, while backing the domestic supply plays the opposite role. Thus, these results provide us with policy recommendations: to implement high and binding reserve requirements, but keeping the backing of the money supply to a minimum. In the extreme case of 0 θ = , the order of the dynamic system is reduced, which one can interpret as the ultimate stabilization of dynamic equilibria.
With respect to the properties of dynamic paths under a hard peg, we must point out following. In the first place, all dynamic systems under a hard peg have first order difference equations, eliminating the possibility of cyclical fluctuations in the debt-structure vector that are typically associated with complex eigenvalues.
Second, regarding the core, the full spectrum dynamics can be observed under fixed, while floating allowed only for monotonic dynamics; the latter implies that a fixed exchange rate regime promotes endogenously-arising volatility around the stationary core, while floating does not. There is a trade-off, however, vis-à-vis the foreigndebt structure and the state-contingent consumption: floating promotes higher order and very complicated dynamics that allow for nontrivial regions with complex eigenvalues in which cyclical and non-cyclical fluctuations are intertwined. In some cases, fluctuations can be significantly large and explosive, and the volatility may arise from a very large and unstable real part together with explosively-large and diverging amplitude of the cyclical component. A hard peg, instead, prevents the latter from occurring, and there is only a very small range for first order, simpler oscillating dynamics. Finally, the policy recommendations vary drastically across regimes: i) high and binding reserve requirements promote and extend the stability of dynamic equilibria under floating, while the only preserve stability and prevent monotonic divergence under fixed; ii) the backing of the money supply is a de-stabilizing policy parameter under floating, but it promotes stability under fixed; iii) the policy recommendations are exact opposites; floating requires very high reserve requirements and a very low backing of the money supply but an economy with fixed exchange regime is better-off with a combination of very low reserve requirements and a very high backing of the money supply.
Next, we examined the case of a sudden stop in a small, open economy that is a net borrower from the rest of the world. We show the existence of multiple equilibria that we may rank based on the presence of binding information constraints and on social welfare, where bank-runs with insolvent banks is the leastpreferred outcome. Not surprisingly, we also find that the magnitude of the reduction in foreign credit determines the existence of different types of equilibria and their likelihood to occur. However, more importantly, we find that a policy of reserve requirements reduces the polarization of economic outcomes by providing the economy with some intermediate and less tenebrous kinds of equilibria, it increases the scope for the economy to attain highest welfare equilibria, and it reduces significantly the likelihood of the economy facing the worst possible outcomes. Finally, this policy may reduce the scope for fragility and volatility of the banking system, regardless of the exchange rate regime in place. Future research: nominal domestic and foreign liabilities; introducing production and capital accumulation. Step 1
Step 3
Step 2 We summarize the existence of these stationary equilibria in Table A σ , the scope for complex eigenvalues with negative real parts decreases until it eventually disappears, and the sequence becomes: (+)sink, (+)complex-stable, but with almost explosive values of the discriminant which translate into very large cyclical fluctuations. In conclusion, low enough rates of foreign inflation contribute to the goal of increased stability and determinacy of dynamic equilibria, as one might expect, but coupled with endogenously-arising volatility.
• Dynamics and world interest rates. In this case, we proceed by changing gradually the pair ( ) * 2 , r R r = 27 to study how the dynamic sequence changes. We describe our findings below. a) For 1 r R = = (i.e. zero net returns,) the associated dynamic sequence is: (+)sink, (+)complex-stable, (-) complex-stable, (-)sink and (-)saddle, where the scope for determinacy dominates. Thus, this combination of returns eliminates the scope for diverging non-cyclical fluctuations.
b) As ( ) , r R increase gradually, the dynamic sequence converges to the baseline sequence. c) As the pair ( ) , r R continues to increase, the scope for complex eigenvalues increases significantly together with the source, while the scope for determinacy eventually disappears completely. Thus, high foreign interest rates promote instability and fairly large cyclical and non-cyclical fluctuations.
• Dynamics and reserve requirements. We proceed by increasing gradually both reserve requirements, with the condition that 0. reduce the scope for complex eigenvalues and (-) source, which gives rise to a (-)sink and a significantly larger range of (-) saddle. Thus, high and binding reserve requirements promote stability and determinacy along the dynamic paths.
• Dynamics and backing of the money supply. Different fractions of the money supply to be backed by the monetary authority introduce interesting changes in the dynamic sequence, which we describe below. The reader will notice that the policy parameter θ plays the role of de-stabilizing of dynamic equilibria. a) When 0 θ = , the order of the dynamic system decreases to a first order nonlinear difference equation. As a result, for low enough values of σ , the eigenvalue is positive and stable, promoting monotonic dynamics. As σ increases, the eigenvalue becomes negative but stable and damped oscillations are observed along dynamic paths. Finally, for values of σ that are high enough, the negative eigenvalue turns unstable, and explosive oscillations take place. b) For very low, non-zero values of θ , the system turns into a second order nonlinear difference equation where the following dynamic sequence arises: (+)sink, (+)complex-stable, (-)complex-stable, (-)sink and (-)saddle. This sequence displays both stability and determinacy along dynamic paths. c) As the backing of the domestic money supply increases, the dynamic sequence converges to the baseline sequence, where instability is observed.
d) For values of θ close enough to 1, the scope for complex eigenvalues increases significantly, eliminating gradually the (-) source as well as the (-) saddle. Dynamic equilibria are indeterminate and large cyclical and non-cyclical fluctuations dominate along dynamic paths.
• Dynamics and combinations of reserve requirements and backing of the domestic money supply. We now evaluate alternative combinations of reserve requirements and backing of the domestic money supply, in order to find the combination that promotes stability and determinacy. We now describe our findings. a) Low ( ) and (-)saddle. Thus, this combination of policy parameters promotes both the stability and determinacy of dynamic equilibria. Equilibria of Type 4 do not exist in Case 3.
Existence of Equilibria under a Hard Peg

